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CASE COMMENT
Comment: Jurisdiction in Transnational
Securities Fraud Cases-Securities &
Exchange Commission v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109
(3d Cir. 1977)
I. INTRODUCTION
SEC v. Kasser' is a recent decision in the series of transna-
tional securities fraud cases wherein the federal courts have
devised tests to determine when subject matter jurisdiction is
proper under SEC rule 10b-5, 2 promulgated pursuant to section
10(b) 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The holding of
SEC v. Kasser purports to extend subject matter jurisdiction
in transnational securities fraud cases beyond any prior deci-
sions. It is submitted, however, that the holding may be limited
somewhat by reference to the facts of the case, which facts
could satisfy more conservative tests of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The Kasser decision also makes an important contribu-
tion by articulating policies which identify U.S. interests in
applying rule 10b-5 to transnational securities transactions.
The events in this case leading up to an alleged rule 10b-5
violation began in the mid-1960s when the Canadian provincial
government of Manitoba created the Manitoba Development
Fund in order to interest private enterprise in the creation of a
1. 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility or any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-I (1970).
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forestry complex.5 Kasser and his codefendants allegedly in-
duced the Fund to enter into investment contracts with and
acquire debentures of two defendant corporations, largely
owned and dominated by Kasser.6 Under the investment con-
tracts, the Fund was to make loans to the two defendant corpo-
rations in exchange for debentures. The Fund entered into the
contracts and acquired the debentures based on false represen-
tations that Kasser and his associates, or corporations they
controlled, had invested and would invest capital in equity
securities of the two defendant corporations over and above the
proceeds obtained from debenture sales to the Fund. However,
the defendants never made the equity investments. Instead,
they recirculated the proceeds of the loans and debenture
transactions, making the required equity investments not with
additional capital but with the very money previously made
available by the Fund. Over several years the Fund invested
about $45,000,000 in debt securities issued by the defendant
corporations. These payments were made because of misrepre-
sentations to and concealment of material facts from the Fund.
The defendants falsely represented that substantial equity
capital had been invested in the two defendant corporations
and spent for development of the forestry complex. Moreover,
the defendants diverted much of the money invested in the two
defendant corporations to their own personal use. As a result,
both corporations went bankrupt.7
The court noted that the following conduct forming part
of the defendants' scheme occurred in this country: (1) various
negotiations; (2) execution of one ofthe investment contracts
in New York; (3) utilization of the instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce (e.g., telephones and mails) to further the
scheme; (4) incorporation of defendant companies in the
United States, or at least the establishment of corporate off-
ices; (5) use of the New York office of a Swiss bank as a conduit
for the moneys received from the Fund; (6) the maintenance
of books and records in this country; (7) drafting of agreements
executed elsewhere; and (8) transmittal of proceeds from the
transactions to and from the United States.8
5. 391 F. Supp. 1167, 1169 (D.N.J. 1975).





The Third Circuit court held that it is proper to exercise
jurisdiction in an SEC suit for injunctive relief' against viola-
tions of the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts "in transnational securities cases where at least some ac-
tivity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs within
this country."' 0
II. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Effect and Conduct Theories
The application of rule 10b-5 to transnational securities
fraud cases is limited to those transactions with which the
United States has a significant connection or interest. Princi-
ples of international law form the basis of theories devised by
the courts to assess this connection. These principles of inter-
national law" distinguish between jurisdiction to prescribe a
rule of law and jurisdiction to enforce a rule of law. A country
is permitted to prescribe a rule of law (a) for conduct occurring
within its territory, 2 (b) when conduct outside a territory pro-
duces a substantial, direct and foreseeable effect within its
territory,'3 and (c) for conduct of its nationals wherever the
conduct occurs." A country has jurisdiction to enforce in a
9. See notes 35 & 36 infra.
10. 548 F.2d at 114.
11. Principles of interntional law formulated by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FORmON RELAIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES represent the opinion of the American
Law Institute as to the rules that an international tribunal would apply in deciding a
controversy in accordance with international law [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
12. RESTATEMENT § 17 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its
territory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects
of the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest local-
ized, in its territory.
13. RESTATEMENT § 18 provides:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a, rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if...
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity
to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial;
(iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal sys-
tems.
14. RESTATEMENT § 30 provides:
(1) A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
1978
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proceeding brought within its territory any rule of law that it
has jurisdiction to prescribe.'5 The major theories applied by
the courts in deciding whether to assume subject matter juris-
diction in a transnational securities fraud case have been based
upon a certain effect occurring within the United States or
certain conduct taking place here. No support has been gener-
ated for a theory that would authorize the United States to
apply rule 10b-5 in every case where an American national is
charged with fraud regardless of where the conduct or effect
occurs.16
In the transnational securities fraud context,17 effects-
based jurisdiction was first proposed in Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook. '5 In that case, an American shareholder of a Cana-
dian corporation, Banff, brought a shareholder derivative ac-
tion for damages to the corporation resulting from the sale of
Banff treasury stock to defendant corporations. The plaintiff
alleged a violation of rule 10b-5 in the nature of a conspiracy
between the Banff board of directors who were individual de-
fendants and the defendant corporations to defraud Banff by
making Banff sell treasury shares at the market price which the
defendants, who had inside information not yet disclosed to the
public, knew did not represent the true value of the shares.'"
The court formulated the effects test of jurisdiction based on
congressional intent in enacting the Exchange Act. The court
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct of a national of the
state wherever the conduct occurs ....
15. R STATEM ET § 20 provides: "A state has jurisdiction to enforce within its
territory a rule of law validly prescribed by it."
16. Compare ]IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1016 (2d Cir. 1975) and F.O.F.
Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co., 400 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), where American nationality of the defendant is not alone sufficient to confer
subject matter jurisdiction, with notes 49, 63, and 75 and accompanying text infra,
where control by a U.S. defendant from the United States would support subject
matter jurisdiction.
17. For application of the effects theory in a criminal context, see Strassheim v.
Dailey, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). For application of the effects theory in an antitrust case,
see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
18. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.) (holding that lower court had jurisdiction, but that
plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under rule lOb-5), rev'd in part and
remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (reversing dismissal for failure to state
a claim), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), noted in 1 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 168
(1969).
19. 405 F.2d at 204.
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believed "that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic inves-
tors who have purchased foreign securities on American ex-
changes and to protect the domestic securities market from the
effects of improper foreign transactions in American securi-
ties. '" Therefore, the court held that it had
subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the Securities Ex-
change Act although the transactions which are alleged to violate
the Act take place outside the United States, at least when the
transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national se-
curities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of Ameri-
can investors."'
The conspiracy and sale of stock at less than true value to
defendant corporations in Canada were detrimental to the in-
terests of the American plaintiff because they lowered the price
of his stock of the same issue which was registered and listed
on a national exchange.Y
The conduct theory of subject matter jurisdiction was de-
veloped in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell. 2 In that suit for damages, an American corporation
alleged that defendants conspired to cause plaintiff to buy
stock in the defendant British corporation at prices in excess
of its true value by making misrepresentations in violation of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5. 24 Misrepresen-
tations were made in New York and London. 25 A contract was
signed in New York whereby plaintiff offered to buy shares of
the defendant corporation and defendant agreed to accept the
offer. 2 However, before the agreement was closed, plaintiff
purchased the shares on the London Stock Exchange through
a London banking firm, because defendants informed plaintiff
of rumors of a counter-takeover bid.
27
The court first examined the conduct occurring within this
country and developed a causation test to determine whether
20. Id. at 206.
21. Id. at 208.
22. Id.
23. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
24. Id. at 1330.
25. Id. at 1331-32, 1335.
26. Id. at 1332.
27. Id.
1978
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the conduct would be sufficient under international law princi-
ples to permit jurisdiction."8 According to its causation test, the
American activity must be an essential link inducing the pur-
chase. Although the precise details causing the loss need not
be reasonably foreseeable, the damages must be within the
area where the defendant had unlawfully created a risk of loss.29
The court found that significant conduct occurred in this coun-
try and that the contract was an essential link inducing the
purchases, irrespective of whether the purchases were triggered
by the misrepresentations made in New York or London."
After concluding that the conduct in this country provided
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction under principles of interna-
tional law, the court considered whether Congress would have
wished the antifraud provision to apply to the transaction.',
The court concluded that in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
Congress intended to prevent fraud in the sale or purchase of
securities whether or not traded on organized U.S. markets,
and that such protection was not limited to securities of Ameri-
can issuers. 32 The court held that subject matter jurisdiction
existed because there was an impact on an American company
and its shareholders, and because substantial misrepresen-
tations occurred in this country.
33
Whether the effect and conduct theories enunciated in
Schoenbaum and Leasco should be applied concurrently, or
alternatively, or if they should be balanced is a point raised in
Recaman v. Barish.3 Based on the distinction between the
facts of Schoenbaum and Leasco, it is suggested that these
theories may be applied alternatively. Where the transactions
which violate the Act take place outside the United States, but
a domestic investor suffers a loss from his purchase of foreign
securities which are registered and listed on a national ex-
change, then subject matter jurisdiction would vest under rule
10b-5 according to the Schoenbaum holding. However, where
an American corporation suffers a loss from its purchase
28. Id. at 1334-35.
29. Id. at 1335.
30. Id. at 1334-35.
31. Id. at 1335.
32. Id. at 1336.
33. Id. at 1337.
34. 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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abroad of foreign securities that are not registered or listed on
a national exchange, then according to the Leasco holding,
substantial misrepresentations must occur in this country, in
addition to the impact felt by an American corporation and its
shareholders, before jurisdiction will vest under rule 10b-5.
B. Foreign Victims
Where foreign individuals or foreign corporations seek to
invoke the protection of rule 10b-5 in suits on their own behalf,
or in class or derivative actions, or where the SEC sues to
enjoin 31 fraudulent activity perpetrated against foreigners, the
law is in flux regarding the conduct or effect within the United
States that is necessary before jurisdiction will vest .3 The juris-
dictional section of the 1934 Act provides little insight into the
issue of when it is proper to exercise subject matter jurisdiction
in such cases. 37 Nor does section 30(b)38 automatically exempt
transnational securities transactions from the application of
rule 10b-5.3 ' No legislative history illuminates this issue .4 Nor
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (Supp. V 1975).
36. Each type of action may present different considerations in the decision to
assume jurisdiction. In a class action there is the problem of "the dubious binding
effect of a defendants' judgment (or a possibly inadequate plaintiff's judgment) on
absent foreign plaintiffs or the propriety of purporting to bind such plaintiffs by a
settlement." Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 986 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1018 (1975). "Such problems are not presented where the SEC seeks to enjoin
activity as in SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla.
1963), and SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973), . . . or
when the action is by named plaintiffs, as in Leasco or in ]IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d
1001 (2d Cir. 1975) .... Id. at 986 n.26. Cf. lIT, 519 F.2d at 1017-18: "If there would
be subject matter jurisdiction over a suit by the SEC to prevent the concoction of
securities frauds in the United States for export, there would also seem to be jurisdic-
tion over a suit for damages or rescission by a defrauded foreign individual." See also
Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 HARV. L. REv.
553, 563-68 (1976) for a discussion of the problems presented in assuming jurisdiction
over suits by individual victims of fraud, suits by or on behalf of corporations, and
derivative suits against corporate management.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970) provides:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder
shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securi-
ties without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such
business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commis-
sion may prescribe as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of
this chapter.
39. Section 30(b) did not exempt the transaction in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), because it was not part of "a business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States," but was only an isolated
1978
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do any SEC rules or regulations provide any guidance.
The usual presumption is against extra-territorial applica-
tion of legislation.,' The courts have found this presumption is
rebutted where the United States has a significant interest or
connection with a transnational securities transaction. In as-
sessing this connection, the cases discussed below42 have exam-
ined first whether the United States has a sufficient basis
under principles of international law to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction, and secondly, if this basis exists, whether Con-
gress would have wished the Securities Acts to apply. Policy
considerations are important in determining congressional in-
tent.4 This approach was taken in the leading cases of Bersch
v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.," and IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,'4 in formu-
lating tests46 for subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of
foreign plaintiffs. These tests examined the conduct occurring
foreign transaction. Id. at 207. Nor did section 30(b) exempt the transaction in SEC
v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973), where the court distin-
guished the words "without the jurisdiction of the United States" from the concept of
without the territorial limits of the United States. Id. at 357-58. Finally, section 30(b)
had no application in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1336 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. "The legislative history is silent respecting the jurisdictional scope questions
at issue here." SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 n.21 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Venture
Fund v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For a
summary of the legislative history of the Exchange Act see 2 L. Loss, SECURTMES
REGULATION 784 n.2 (1961).
41. Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975); See Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd in part and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d
Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
42. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975); IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Recaman v. Barish, 408
F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975); F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Young & Co.,
400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). These cases take an approach similar to that of
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). See
text accompanying notes 23-33 supra.
43. See, e.g., SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977); notes 90-92 and
accompanying text infra.
44. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
45. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
46. This author's use of the term "test" does not mean to imply that the decision
to assume jurisdiction is reached simply by a process of matching new facts to an old
paradigm of effect or conduct. See, e.g., Venture Fund v. Willkie Farr & Gallagher,
418 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). For the view that an effects test has "little
independent analytic significance," see Note, supra note 36, at 563, where the author
suggests that the securities fraud cases "appear to turn [instead] on a reconciliation
of American and foreign interests in regulating their respective economies and business
affairs."
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within this country. The case law subsequent to Bersch and IT
has generally adhered to their holdings. SEC v. Kasser, how-
ever, purports to break new ground by liberalizing the conduct
required in this country before jurisdiction will vest.'7
In one line of cases, the courts have outlined those effects
within the United States which will support subject matter
jurisdiction and those effects which will not trigger application
of rule 10b-5 when foreigners are defrauded in transnational
securities transactions. In SEC actions to enjoin fraudulent
activity injuring American and foreign investors, the courts
have upheld subject matter jurisdiction based on the adverse
effect on American investors. This effect was demonstrated
where offers to sell were made in the United States in SEC v.
Gulf Intercontinental Finance Corp."5 or where Americans suf-
fered a loss from their purchase of securities in a fraudulent
transaction as in SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc.'9 In Des
47. See text accompanying notes 83-89.
48. 223 F. Supp. 987 (S.D. Fla. 1963). In this case, the individual defendants'
scheme to defraud began by creating the defendant Canadian corporation and offering
8 and 81/2% notes to the public through Canadian newspapers which circulated in
Canada and the United States. The Canadian corporation made loans to the defendant
Florida corporations which were created by the individual defendants. Funds from the
Florida corporation bank accounts were withdrawn by the individual defendants for
salaries and travel expenses, causing a material working capital impairment for the
Florida corporations. The Florida corporations had no realized net income or any
earnings available to meet interest requirements on the funds advanced by the Cana-
dian corporation. The Canadian corporation paid interest to its noteholders out of the
principal, causing a substantial principal impairment, without disclosure to note hold-
ers of the actual source of the interest payments.
This was the first suit brought by the SEC to enjoin a fraudulent scheme perpe-
trated against foreign investors. It was decided prior to Schoenbaum and Leasco, and
hence the court did not have the benefit of the guidance provided by their effect and
conduct theories. However, the court upheld subject matter jurisdiction on the basis
that some misleading offers to sell the notes were made in the United States, through
Canadian newspapers sold here, and held that it was not necessary to make a showing
that the offers were accepted by actual sale in this country, or that the alleged misre-
presentations were in fact successful in inducing the sale of such securities by reliance
thereon.
In commenting upon the Gulf holding, the court in Recaman v. Barish, 408 F.
Supp. 1189, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1975) noted: "[O]f equal importance is the fact that...
the 'true issuers' of the notes of Gulf Intercontinental . . .were the individual and
corporate Florida defendants and that Gulf Intercontinental was nothing more than a
conduit for the securities issued by the Florida corporation."
49. 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973). Here, the defendant was an American holding
company owning and from its home base in the United States controlling a large
number of service and investment companies incorporated in foreign countries. Offers
and sales of shares in mutual funds of the various investment companies were made
1978
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Brisay v. Goldfield Corp.,50 a class action for damages where
only one member of the class was American, subject matter
jurisdiction was upheld on the basis of an adverse effect on the
American securities market from the improper use of securities
of an American corporation which were registered and listed on
a national exchange.
The court in Finch v. Marathon Securities Corp.,5' held
that there was no effect within the United States to support
subject matter jurisdiction where a foreign investor had been
to foreigners. The SEC sought a preliminary injunction alleging that defendants had
violated various antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts and rule 10b-5 by
obtaining money from investors by means of untrue statements and omissions to state
material facts. The court upheld subject matter jurisdiction on much the same basis
as it had in SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp. While foreign investors were
defrauded in both cases, in the Gulf case offers to sell were made in the United States,
and in the UFG case, stock was actually sold to at least three Americans who lost
$10,000 from their investment. The court assumed subject matter jurisdiction based
upon this impact on American investors as a result of substantial activity within the
United States. This holding was supported by evidence that (a) there were American
owners of shares of the defendant companies, (b) there were offers and sales of stock
to American citizens, (c) the foreign companies were directed and controlled from the
United States, and (d) the mails and other facilities of interstate commerce were used
in the preparation and distribution of misleading prospectuses, to set up sales meetings
and to consummate investment transactions.
50. 549 P.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1977). This class action was brought to recover damages
based upon an allegedly fraudulent stock transaction between a Canadian corporation
and the defendant Goldfield Corporation, an American corporation. Members of the
class were former shareholders of the Canadian corporation, only one of whom was an
American citizen. The alleged fraud involved defendant Goldfield's contract to pur-
chase and take over the assets of the Canadian corporation, including all its stock. The
purchase price of $3,000,000 was to be paid in Goldfield stock which was registered and
listed on the American Stock Exchange. The manner in which the takeover transaction
was effected violated particular substantive provisions of the securities acts and proxi-
mately resulted in the collapse of the American market in Goldfield's shares. The court
held that subject matter jurisdiction would vest under the Schoenbaum effects theory
because the improper use of securities of an American corporation which were regis-
tered and listed on a national exchange adversely affected not only the plaintiffs but
also the American market in that corporation's securities.
51. 316 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In this private action for damages, the
British plaintiff charged that violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 were commit-
ted by another British individual as agent of defendant EICL, a Bermuda investment
company. The plaintiff signed an agreement in Great Britain to purchase EICL's
interest in another British corporation. The agreement was signed allegedly in reliance
upon misrepresentations made in London. The securities purchased in London were
neither registered nor traded on an American exchange. Applying the Schoenbaum
effects theory, the court held that it was without subject matter jurisdiction because
there was no injury to domestic investors who purchased foreign securities on American




defrauded in his purchase abroad of securities which were not
registered or listed on an American exchange. Where a fraudu-
lent transaction outside of the United States allegedly results
in loss of foreign investor confidence in American underwriters
and securities and in increased problems of U.S. corporations
seeking to raise capital abroad, and has a general adverse effect
on the prices of American securities, these effects will not sup-
port subject matter jurisdiction where there is no intention that
the securities should be offered to anyone in the United
States. 52 Also, where any loss to Americans is a result of a fraud
practiced upon the trust in which they have invested, and not
a fraud practiced upon individual Americans in their purchase
of securities, this effect is insufficient for jurisdiction to vest.5"
Assuming no adverse impact on U.S. investors who have
purchased securities on American exchanges, and no adverse
impact on the domestic securities market from improper for-
eign transactions in American securities, another line of cases
has also upheld subject matter jurisdiction over actions where
foreigners are defrauded when certain conduct occurs within
the United States. In Wandschneider v. Industrial Incomes of
North America, 5, the court held that where misrepresentations
52. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1018 (1975).
53. UT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Venture Fund v. Wilikie
Farr & Gallagher, 418 F. Supp. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). UT allegedly had 300 U.S. citizens
and residents as fundholders which amounted to only .2% of EUT's fundholders. The
court found that this was not the substantial effect of RESTATMErr § 18. IT, 519 F.2d
at 1016-17. Similarly, Venture Fund had 22,000 shareholders, only two of whom were
American citizens. Venture Fund, 418 F. Supp. at 553-54. The indirect injuries to these
American shareholders "as a result of a fraud allegedly perpetrated on Venture Fund
could not of themselves constitute effects within the United States substantial enough
to sustain jurisdiction .... " Id. at 554 n.6.
54. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,422 at 92,054
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The defendant was a New York corporation engaged in managing
mutual funds and selling their shares. It employed the defendant agent who visited
the plaintiff in West Germany to induce her to invest in Industrial Incomes. The agent
explained the general prospectus written in English and containing several misrepre-
sentations and omissions to state material facts and also communicated some addi-
tional oral misrepresentations, including a statement that Industrial Incomes was
regulated by the SEC when in fact the stock of Industrial Incomes had not been
registered with the SEC. The plaintiff relied on these material misrepresentations in
purchasing $50,000 worth of Industrial Incomes stock. Shortly after purchasing the
stocks, plaintiff could not redeem them as had been represented to her, and the stocks
were worthless. The court cited Schoenbaum in holding that there was subject matter
jurisdiction under rule 10b-5 where the misrepresentations were devised within the
1978
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are devised within the United States by U.S. residents, where
the sale is effected within the United States,55 and where U.S.
mails are used for fraudulent misrepresentations," subject
matter jurisdiction will vest over a foreigner's claim for dam-
ages. Conversely, when the false and misleading prospectus
and oral statements are communicated abroad and the pur-
chase of shares also takes place abroad, subject matter jurisdic-
tion will not vest over a class action for damages brought by
foreigners, as the court held in Recaman v. Barish.57
The two leading cases in formulating conduct tests to de-
termine the existence of subject matter jurisdiction when for-
eigners are defrauded are Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.58 and
United States by U.S. residents, where the sale was effected within the United States,
and where the U.S. mails were used for the fraudulent misrepresentations.
It is suggested that the reliance on Schoenbaum is misplaced. Schoenbaum held
that subject matter jurisdiction would vest where a transaction outside the United
States involved stock registered and listed on a National Securities Exchange and was
detrimental to the interests of American investors. See text accompanying notes 20-
22 supra. This effect is clearly lacking in Wandschneider. For the suggestion that the
court upheld jurisdiction in part because of defendant's misuse of the SEC name, see
Note, supra note 36, at 570 n.101.
55. Regarding the locus of the sale, compare [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,058 and 92,065 where plaintiff signed an application to
purchase shares in West Germany, withdrew funds from a West German bank and sent
them to New York where the share certificates were issued, and the court found that
the sale was effected in New York; with Recaman v. Barish, 408 F. Supp. 1189, 1200
(E.D. Pa. 1975) where an application for purchase was filled out in Colombia and the
authorization was made there to withdraw funds from plaintiff's Miami bank account,
and the court found that the purchase took place in Colombia.
56. Compare Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 210 (2d Cir.), rev'd in part
and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969),
with SEC v. Gulf Intercontinental Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 995 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
57. 408 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The named plaintiffs who were citizens of
Colombia, South America, sought damages for themselves and all who purchased
shares of U.S. Investment Fund (USIF). Plaintiffs alleged that the prospectus and oral
statements pursuant to which offers and sales were made were false and misleading
and violated rule 10b-5 and other antifraud provisions. The court granted defendants'
motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court
first applied the Schoenbaum rule that if securities were registered and listed on a
national exchange, then the alleged fraud would have an impact on the domestic
securities market. However, in the Recaman case this impact did not occur because
the USIF securities were never listed on a U.S. stock exchange or traded over the
counter within the United States. The court also cited SEC v. United Financial Group,
Inc. and Bersch where an impact within the United States occurred when sales of
securities were made to U.S. citizens or residents. Since the two named plaintiffs were
neither citizens nor residents of the United States, no impact occurred in that respect.
Nor, presumably, were the other members of the class Americans, since the trust deed,
prospectus and investment program certificate provided that shares were not eligible
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1IT v. Vencap, Ltd.,59 companion cases decided on the same
day by the Second Circuit. In Bersch, the court held that where
acts or culpable failures to act within the United States di-
rectly cause a loss to foreigners, subject matter jurisdiction will
vest over their claims. 0 Where the sale to foreign investors
occurred abroad, simply preparing the offerings and part of the
prospectus in the United States was not conduct directly caus-
ing the loss." Rather, the Bersch court found that these activi-
ties within the United States were merely preparatory or took
the form of culpable nonfeasance, and were relatively small in
comparison to those abroad.2
In HT v. Vencap, Ltd.,13 the court held that where fraudu-
for ownership by residents of the United States. The court also applied the Leasco test
requiring significant conduct within the United States with respect to the alleged
violation before jurisdiction would vest under the antifraud provisions. The court
found that this test was not satisfied since the false and misleading prospectus and
oral statements were communicated in Colombia and the purchase of shares took place
there also.
58. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). In Bersch, plaintiff
brought an action for damages individually and on behalf of a class of persons who
purchased common stock of Investors Overseas Services, Ltd. (IOS), an international
sales and financial service organization principally engaged in the sale and manage-
ment of mutual funds. The class consisted of Americans residing in the United States,
Americans residing abroad, and foreigners. Plaintiff alleged that IOS and other de-
fendants violated rule 10b-5 by failing to reveal material facts in their prospectus. The
offerings were prepared, in part, in the United States, and a part of the prospectus was
also prepared here. Shares, which were neither registered nor listed, were sold under a
prospectus outside the United States to foreign nationals. In reaching its conclusion
not to assume subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the foreign plaintiffs, the
reasoning of the Bersch court was similar to the Leasco approach. Although the U.S.
based activities in Bersch were sufficient for jurisdiction to vest under the principle of
international law expressed by RESTATEMENT § 17, the U.S. conduct did not satisfy the
test which the court fashioned in its interpretation of congressional intent.
59. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
60. 519 F.2d at 993.
61. See id. at 985 n.24, 987.
62. Id. at 987.
63. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs, liquidators of UIT, an international
investment trust organized under the laws of Luxembourg, brought an action against
Vencap, a Bahamian venture capital firm; Pistell, its president and chairman of the
board; and Vencap's American lawyers. The agreement for the purchase by UT of three
million dollars in Vencap's preferred securities was drafted in New York by IIT's
lawyers and exchanged in New York with Vencap's lawyers. The sale was closed in the
Bahamas. Pistell subsequently caused Vencap to enter into several questionable trans-
actions involving dispositions of Vencap funds which plaintiffs alleged were inconsist-
ent with the operation of a bona fide venture capital firm and which may also have
been injurious to shareholder interests. The court noted that what are fraudulent acts
sufficient to uphold jurisdiction depends upon the theory of fraud. For example, under
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lent acts were committed in the United States, subject matter
jurisdiction would vest over the claims of the foreign plaintiff
investment trust because Congress did not intend "to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudu-
lent security devices for export, even when these are peddled
only to foreigners." 4 The court noted that mere preparatory
activities, or the failure to prevent fraudulent acts, where the
bulk of the activity was performed in foreign countries would
not be sufficient conduct for jurisdiction to vest. 5
In the class action of F.O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd. v.
Arthur Young & Co.,6" the first case to apply the Bersch and
HT holdings, the court declined to assume subject matter juris-
diction because no activity within the United States directly
caused the plaintiff's loss. The court found that the allegedly
fraudulent conduct directly causing losses to F.O.F. Proprie-
tary consisted of the sale of the debentures and the distribution
of the materially misleading offering circulars to purchasers
a theory that Pistell committed a fraud through transactions which funneled substan-
tial amounts of Vencap funds into his own hands, the court suggested that fraudulent
acts would be committed in this country where a New York office was used as a base
for the fraud, including directing the transactions and maintaining transactional re-
cords there. The court then remanded for further findings as to the factual basis for
different theories of rule 10b-5 liability to determine the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.
64. Id. at 1017.
65. Id. at 1018.
66. 400 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Plaintiff, a Canadian mutual fund, pur-
chased one million dollars in convertible guaranteed debentures from Farrington Over-
seas Corp. (FOC), a Delaware corporation, allegedly in reliance on a misleading offer-
ing circular. In order to comply with the federal securities laws and with federal
regulations, the FOC debenture offering circular provided that the debentures were not
registered and were not being offered to nationals or residents of the United States,
nor to residents of Canada or Canadian corporations. The SEC agreed that the deben-
tures need not be registered if underwriters and their purchasers signed a covenant
regarding this restriction on offer and sale of the debentures. Thus F.O.F. Proprietary,
a Canadian mutual fund, purchased the debentures in violation of federal regulations,
the SEC-mandated agreements signed by underwriters and their purchasers, and the
proviso appearing in the offering circular.
In deciding whether to assume subject matter jurisdiction, the court first inter-
preted Bersch and 1IT to require an evaluation of whether Congress would have in-
tended the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to F.O.F. Pro-
prietary's purchase of the FOC debentures. The court held that since plaintiff was not
within the group of intended or lawful offerees of the FOC debentures, Congress would
not have intended to extend the protection of the securities acts to such a transaction
that was predominantly foreign. Moreover, subject matter jurisdiction could not be
upheld under the test of Bersch and HT, since no conduct within the United States
directly caused the plaintiff's loss.
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and the misleading information transmitted at closing, all of
which occurred abroad. 7 The drafting of the offering circular
in the United States was deemed merely preparatory. 8
In Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC,"6 the court upheld subject
matter jurisdiction based upon the IT holding that the United
States was used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent secu-
rity devices for export.70 There, the United States was the locus
of the fraudulent payment of give-ups from one registered
broker-dealer to another in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities in the United States over-the-counter market,
although the payment of give-ups was at the expense of off-
shore funds only one of which had American shareholders.'
Of the cases applying the conduct theory, Straub v.
Vaisman 2 is most central to the reasoning of the court in SEC
67. Id. at 1223.
68. Id.
69. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), reh. denied, 551 F.2d 915 (1977), cert. denied, 46
U.S.L.W. 3425 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1978) (No. 77-275). Here, the court considered the appli-
cation of rule lob-5 to conduct which formed the basis for revoking petitioner broker-
dealer's registration and barring petitioner principal owner from association with any
broker or dealer. The conduct involved payment of give-ups by Lipper Corp. to IPC
(a registered broker-dealer and subsidiary to 1OS) amounting to $1,450,000 out of
commissions earned by Lipper Corp. on over-the-counter transactions for three off-
shore funds for which IOS was investment adviser. The court held that Lipper and his
company wilfully aided and abetted IOS in committing a fraud on the funds by divert-
ing to itself, through IPC, rebates which belonged to the funds while IPC was doing
nothing in return. Since the United States was used as the base for manufacturing
fraudulent security devices, the court upheld jurisdiction under the IIT test. The court
found that the activity in the United States was not merely preparatory.
70. Id. at 179.
71. Id.
72. 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976). Defendant was a registered broker-dealer in New
Jersey. In reliance on a telex from defendant and conversations with the defendant's
agent, the West German plaintiff authorized the purchase of 10,000 shares at $4 per
share through the defendant broker-dealer. The defendant had inside information that
the company whose stock it was recommending was almost bankrupt. The plaintiff
alleged that this failure to disclose was a 10b-5 violation. In deciding whether to
assume subject matter jurisdiction, the court began with the premise that this was not
a predominantly foreign transaction, as in Bersch and IT. The court then observed
that:
Conduct within the United States is alone sufficient from a jurisdictional
standpoint to apply the federal statutes, Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States § 17 (1965), and the question
may simply be whether, on policy grounds, we should apply the securities
legislation. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 478
F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (2d Cir. 1972).
540 F.2d at 595. However, the court upheld subject matter jurisdiction based on the
Bersch test that the conduct within this country directly caused the loss.
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v. Kasser. The Straub court held that jurisdiction would vest
under the Bersch test where the facts directly causing the loss
included (1) the fraudulent scheme was conceived in the
United States by American citizens, 3 (2) involved stock in an
American corporation traded over-the-counter, 4 and (3) a reg-
istered American securities broker from his office in New Jersey
was responsible75 for the wrongful omissions."
III. SEC v. KASSER
In SEC v. Kasser, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the
SEC's action for injunctive relief." The district court reasoned
that Congress did not intend to confer jurisdiction over an es-
sentially foreign transaction unless that transaction had an
impact on domestic investors or securities markets."5 Since no
domestic impact was demonstrated where a Canadian Fund
was defrauded in an investment contract involving debentures
which were neither registered nor traded in this country, the
court declined to assert jurisdiction." The district court also
considered whether conduct by the American defendants in the
United States, although without effect here, was sufficient to
give rise to jurisdiction. It concluded that the various miscella-
neous acts committed in the United States did not materially
alter the essentially foreign nature of the transaction."
The Third Circuit overruled the district court's holding
that a domestic impact was required in this country before
jurisdiction would vest under the antifraud provisions of the
73. Cf. the holding that mere preparatory activities do not support subject matter
jurisdiction over the claims of foreign plaintiffs. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 987 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519
F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir. 1975).
74. Cf. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), rev 'd in part
and remanded, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969):
"Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to
protect . . . the domestic securities market from the effects of improper foreign trans-
actions in American securities."
75. See note 16 supra.
76. The court could have held that the failure to disclose in the telex sent from
the United States was an act directly causing the loss which would have supported
subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 987 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
77. 548 F.2d at 112.
78. 391 F. Supp. at 1175.




securities acts. 8' The court relied on the decision in liT v. Ven-
cap, Ltd., that an impact in the United States was not a juris-
dictional prerequisite, and on a principle articulated in Straub
v. Vaisman, that conduct standing alone is enough for jurisdic-
tion to attach under the federal securities laws. 2
In deciding that the conduct alone in the United States
supported subject matter jurisdiction, the court placed the
greatest reliance on the principle articulated in Straub. The
Kasser court held that "the federal securities laws do grant
jurisdiction in transnational securities cases where at least
some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme occurs
within this country." 3
Notwithstanding this liberal standard, the Kasser court
also suggested that jurisdiction could be upheld based upon the
holdings of liT and Bersch.8s lIT held that jurisdiction would
vest for a foreign plaintiff's claim where conduct in this country
consists of "the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and
does not extend to mere preparatory activities or the failure to
prevent fraudulent acts .... "85 The Kasser court found that
the conduct of the defendants was not merely preparatory since
it was much more substantial than the United States based
activities in lIT."8 This analysis, however, ignores the qualita-
tive difference in the lIT test between preparatory and fraudu-
lent acts and applies the test in a quantitative fashion, by
regarding the Kasser conduct as more "substantial" than the
United States based conduct of liT. Moreover, while the
Kasser court finds the United States based activity is not
merely preparatory, it nowhere states that it amounts to perpe-
tration of fraudulent acts themselves.
The Bersch case held that "the anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities laws . . . do not apply to losses from sales of
securities to foreigners outside the United States unless acts (or
culpable failures to act) within the United States directly
caused such losses." 87 While the Kasser court does not state
81. 548 F.2d at 112-13.
82. Id. at 113.
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id. at 115.
85. 519 F.2d at 1018.
86. 548 F.2d at 115.
87. 519 F.2d at 993.
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that the United States activity directly caused the loss, the
court did "question whether it can be convincingly maintained
that such acts within the United States did not directly cause
any extraterritorial losses.""8 The court found that there was
much more United States based activity in Kasser than in
Bersch, including the execution of a key investment contract
in New York and the maintenance of records in this country
which were crucial to the consummation of the fraud.89
Kasser stressed that policy reasons were important in its
decision to assume subject matter jurisdiction. First, the court
suggested that to refuse jurisdiction
might induce reciprocal responses on the part of other nations.
Some countries might decline to act against individuals and cor-
porations seeking to transport securities frauds to the United
States. Such parties may well be outside the ambit of the power
of our courts . . . . By finding jurisdiction here, we may encour-
age other nations to take appropriate steps against parties who
seek to perpetrate frauds in the United States.
The court interpreted congressional intent that "the antifraud
provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were designed to insure
high standards of conduct in securities transactions within this
country in addition to protecting domestic markets and inves-
tors from the effects of fraud."" The court found it desirable
to "enhance the ability of the SEC to police vigorously the
conduct of securities dealings within the United States," com-
porting with "the basic purposes of the federal statutes."
9 2
While the court in Kasser holds that only "some activity
designed to further a fraudulent scheme" 3 is required within
this country, it is submitted that the holdings may be limited
by the facts of the case. The court deemed various activities
which occurred in the United States "significant conduct
which formed part of the defendants' scheme."" Elsewhere
the court observed that "the sum total of the defendants'
intranational actions was substantial, '"9 5 and that "the de-
88. 548 F.2d at 115.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 116.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 114.
94. Id. at 111-12.
95. Id. at 115.
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fendants' conduct occurring within the borders of this nation
was essential to the plan to defraud.""6 These descriptions
of the conduct in the Kasser case suggest more stringent
standards for jurisdiction than merely "some activity."
IV. CONCLUSION
When a U.S. court is presented with a foreign plaintiff's
action for damages for violation of rule 10b-5, or when the SEC
sues to enjoin violations of rule 10b-5 perpetrated against for-
eigners, the Kasser decision provides a new tool for deciding
whether or not to assume subject matter jurisdiction. Notwith-
standing the observation that the Kasser holding may not be
so liberal as to require merely "some activity" within the
United States before jurisdiction will vest, this case neverthe-
less examines the conduct occurring in the United States in a
quantitative fashion rather than following the qualitative dis-
tinction between fraudulent and preparatory acts of the Bersch
and IT decisions.
According to Bersch and HT, fraudulent acts occurring
within the United States updn which subject matter jurisdic-
tion rests would include the misrepresentation, the sale, or acts
consummating the fraud. In the Kasser case, one of the invest-
ment contracts with misrepresentations regarding the defend-
ants' equity investments was entered into in New Jersey. This
conduct would satisfy the Bersch and IT formulations, since
the misrepresentations would have been made in the United
States, and a transaction in securities would occur here where
the investment contract was executed in the United States.
However, the Kasser decision suggests a different theory
upon which to premise subject matter jurisdiction. After find-
ing that at least eight activities forming part of the fraudulent
scheme occurred in the United States, the court held that only
"some activity" was required before jurisdiction would vest.
Under the lIT test, only the acts consummating the fraud are
relevant for subject matter jurisdiction purposes. However, a
fraudulent scheme may consist of many acts, not just those
consummating the fraud. Therefore, in cases where the theory
is a scheme to defraud under rule 10b-5(a) or a fraudulent
practice or course of business and rule 10b-5(c) which may
96. Id.
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consist of many acts, it is suggested that the quantitative




97. The Kasser approach has also been supported in the Federal Securities Code
of the American Law Institute, which permits United States antifraud law to apply
whenever conduct "occurs to a substantial (but not necessarily predominant) extent
within the United States." ALI FEDERAL SEcUnmEs CODE § 1604(a)(I)(D)(i) (Oct. 1974
revision of Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-3).
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